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Abstract 
Austerity places intense pressures on labour costs in paid care. In the UK, electronic 
monitoring technology has been introduced to record (and materially reduce) the working 
time and wages of homecare workers. Based on empirical findings, we show that, in a ‘time 
of austerity’, care is reductively constructed as a consumption of time. Service users are 
constructed as needy, greedy, time-consumers and homecare workers as resource-wasting 
time-takers. We point to austerity as a temporal ideology aimed at persuading populations 
that individual deprivation in the present moment, self-sacrifice and the suppression of 
personal need in the here and now is a necessary requirement to underpin a more secure 
national future. Accordingly, women in low-waged care work are required to eschew a rights-
bearing, present-tense identity and are assumed willing to suppress their entitlements to 
lawful wages as a sacrifice to the future. By transforming our understandings of ‘care’ into 
those of ‘time consumption’, and by emphasizing the virtue of present-tense deprivation, a 
politics of austerity appears to justify time-monitoring in care provision and the rationing of 
homecare workers’ pay. 
Keywords: austerity, working time, care work, unpaid labour, minimum wage law 
Introduction 
Concerns about the labour-market undervaluing of care work are longstanding (Baines, 2004; 
England et al., 2002; Graham, 1991; Himmelweit, 2007; Mundlak, 2012; Rubery and 
Grimshaw, 2007). However, there has been little examination of the specific organizational 
mechanisms through which the value of paid care work is undermined (Palmer and Eveline, 
2012). Since 2010, the UK government has implemented an austerity programme that has 
severely reduced state spending on public services. In this context, employers in the 
homecare sector have introduced telephone-based technology to monitor working time and 
support local-authority commissioning of home care from (mainly) private-sector providers 
(Bessa et al., 2013; Rubery et al., 2011; UK Homecare Association, UKHCA, 2012). Our 
study is the first to consider how homecare workers experience this electronic monitoring and 
is based on in-depth interviews with female homecare workers in two neighbouring local-
authority areas in the south-west of England. It is both timely and distinctive because we 
position and understand paid care work within an economic, cultural and political landscape 
of austerity. 
In this article we demonstrate how electronic monitoring reduces the wages of homecare 
workers and contributes to an industry-wide problem of non-compliance with UK national 
minimum wage law (National Audit Office, 2016). Our analysis engages with the neoliberal 
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austerity narrative of financial and moral compensation for public-sector excess in the period 
preceding the 2008 financial crash (Pearson and Elson, 2015; Potter and Westall, 2013). We 
suggest that an impact of austerity is to reduce the rights-bearing capacity and legal 
entitlements of low-waged women in homecare work. Accordingly, electronic monitoring is 
far more than the recording of working time. It is a ‘technology relation’ (Cockburn and 
Ormrod, 1993, p. 154) that redefines homecare workers’ labour in quantitative and qualitative 
terms and undermines the labour-market value of paid care work. 
In the UK, over 95 per cent of ‘hands-on’ care workers are women and home care is a poorly 
paid and highly gender-segregated occupation (Carroll et al., 2009; Eborall, 2010; Hussein 
and Manthorpe, 2014). Homecare workers give personal care to older and disabled people: 
visiting them in their own homes to provide assistance with washing, dressing, 
continence/incontinence and basic nursing care. State funding accounts for about 80 per cent 
service volume of the entire UK homecare sector (Holmes, 2015). Wages are by far the 
largest component in the cost of home care (IPC Market Analysis Centre, 2012) and as a rule 
of thumb the price of services purchased from the private sector is half the average cost of 
public-sector homecare provision (UK Homecare Association, UKHCA, 2010). Local 
authorities have a huge influence over, and legal responsibility for, the efficient and effective 
functioning of the homecare market in their respective geographic areas (see Care Act 2014, 
s.5). They also exercise a high degree of control over the price of home care: whether 
services are commissioned by local-authority officers on behalf of service users, or are 
bought in directly by service users in receipt of direct payments issued from the local 
authority (Atkinson and Lucas, 2013; Laing, 2014). 
In the context of austerity, commissioning local authorities increasingly requires employers to 
use electronic monitoring technology to capture real-time data about the start and end times 
of homecare visits (IPC Market Analysis Centre, 2012). It appears that local authorities 
regard electronic monitoring as a remedy for the negative consequences of cuts to their 
budgets, as well as for concerns about care quality (in the sense of wanting assurance that 
visits to older and disabled people are actually made by the organizations with which they 
contract). A social tendency to believe in technology as a panacea for all problems, even 
social ones, is longstanding (Weinberg, 1966). Yet technology is always adopted within the 
context of existing, gendered, norms or values and raises significant questions of social 
equality; who benefits, who suffers, who accumulates, who accommodates? (See Bush, 
2009.) 
In England alone, the pay of hundreds of thousands of private-sector homecare workers is so 
low as to be unlawful according to national minimum-wage law (Gardiner, 2015; Public 
Accounts Committee, 2014). There have been repeated calls for local authorities to attend to 
their commissioning practices in relation to minimum labour standards (Equality and Human 
Rights Commission, 2011; House of Commons Scottish Affairs Committee, 2014; Low Pay 
Commission, 2013). Nevertheless, government intervention has been slow to materialize and 
the most recent statutory guidance falls short of imposing a requirement that local authorities 
ensure the pay of homecare workers employed by contracting organizations meets legal 
minimum standards (Department of Health, 2016). 
Despite poor terms and conditions, the UK's homecare workforce is growing rapidly. Since 
the financial crash, social care has become a main source of women's low-waged 
employment and it is estimated that the care-at-home workforce will double in size across the 
UK within a decade, providing approximately 2 million jobs (Centre for Workforce 
Intelligence, CFWI, 2013; Fenton, 2013; Wittenberg et al., 2011). Unless funding for adult 
social care is increased, intense pressure on labour costs is likely to remain (Atkinson and 
Lucas, 2013; Kingsmill, 2014; Koehler, 2014). 
Recent literature has explored recruitment and retention issues in the homecare industry, 
problems of national minimum wage non-compliance and the widespread use of zero-hours 
contracts (Bessa et al., 2013; Hayes, 2015; Rubery et al., 2011). We build on a growing 
literature focused on the management of working time in homecare (Bolton and Wibberley, 
2014; IPC Market Analysis Centre, 2012; Pennycook et al., 2013; Rubery et al., 2015; 
UNISON, 2012). We find that although electronic monitoring works alongside zero-hours 
contracting in the homecare industry, zero-hours contracts are not a necessary condition of 
electronic monitoring. As organizational strategies, both may be co-implicated in the 
devaluing of caring labour but they are also distinguishable. While zero-hours contracts 
attempt to informalize obligations to provide or undertake work, electronic monitoring 
formalizes a disjunction between paid time and working time. 
We develop an account of austerity in relation to social care and draw attention to ways in 
which particular understandings of time are produced and promoted through the application 
of electronic monitoring technology. Time is the inseparable backdrop against which care 
takes place. Under conditions of austerity, homecare services are reconfigured and care itself 
is reductively constructed as a consumption of time, service users are constructed as needy 
(or greedy) time-consumers and homecare workers as resource-wasting time-takers. We point 
to austerity as a temporal ideology aimed at persuading populations that individual 
deprivation in the present moment, self-sacrifice and the suppression of personal need in the 
here and now is a necessary requirement to underpin a more secure national future. By 
transforming our understandings of ‘care’ into those of ‘time consumption’, and by 
emphasizing the virtue of present-tense deprivation, a politics of austerity appears to justify 
time-monitoring in care provision and the rationing of homecare workers’ pay. However, the 
resultant deprivation is not straightforwardly economic. It dovetails with matters of legal 
standing since austerity requires homecare workers to eschew a rights-bearing, present-tense 
identity and accept the denial of the right to be paid fully in accordance with minimum-wage 
law as a sacrifice to the future. In the face of ongoing budgetary pressures, electronic 
monitoring promotes the acquiescence of homecare workers by embedding organizational 
behaviours and giving rise to individual work routines that purport to rationalize service 
provision and certainly reduce service costs. 
Electronic monitoring is a technological driver for very real degradations of employment and 
pay. It has introduced fundamental changes to the basis upon which homecare workers are 
employed, their capacity to deliver care and their expectation of an entitlement to receive pay 
for doing so. We draw attention to ways in which electronic monitoring recasts 
understandings of ‘care’ in relation to ‘time’ (Harrington, 2012) and suggest that the 
electronic monitoring of homecare workers’ labour represents the rationing of social care in a 
‘time of austerity’. 
Austerity, gender and social care 
Although gender has proven to be a remarkably persistent site of inequality, it is also evident 
that over time, welfare states have delivered a quantifiable reduction in social inequality and 
practical support for women to engage in paid work (Taylor-Gooby, 2009). Yet as a 
consequence of austerity, much of the social infrastructure that promoted women's effective 
participation, as well as their access to legal protections at work, is under threat (Rubery, 
2015; Theodoropoulou and Watt, 2011; Walby, 2009, 2012). EU populations are required to 
attend to individualist and market-led models of citizenship that emphasize self-reliance and 
relegate the recognition of human dependencies to the contingencies of interpersonal 
relations (Cameron, 2009; Finlayson, 2010; Taylor-Gooby, 2009). A politics of austerity thus 
hinges upon gendered assumptions about the capacity of families to provide care, welfare and 
support on the basis of kinship; as well as on the harnessing of women's unpaid labour within 
a domestic or community context. 
Across the EU, states have begun to withdraw from prior political commitments to meet 
welfare needs collectively as a state function (Taylor-Gooby and Stoker, 2011). This has 
coincided with an increasingly confident articulation of social policy in neoliberal terms that 
enables the state to drive the development of markets in welfare, health and care provision, 
and seeks to harness economic competition and market forces in support of a rationing of 
entitlement (Levitas, 2012; Walby, 2009, 2012). Austerity demands that prior political 
commitments to social support, as a collective function of the welfare state, are claimed to be 
no longer affordable (Clarke and Newman, 2012). Austerity has been characterized as a 
process of ideological shift from questions centred on the financial industry to a political 
project intent on placing blame elsewhere (Allen and Taylor, 2012; Clarke and Newman, 
2012). 
The erasure of the idea that the severity of the global economic crash was exacerbated by 
systemic uncertainty (based on a widespread consensus of economists) has permitted an 
austerity response in which vast swathes of people are denied the stability and certainty that 
accompanied notions of state support and welfare (Corsetti, 2012). In the UK, national 
assistance laws in place since the welfare state was founded have been repealed and replaced 
by new legal principles based on ‘wellbeing’ and ‘prevention’ that individualize care needs as 
a matter of social and economic privacy (see Care Act, 2014, s.1; Hayes, 2017). Local 
authority duties to meet care needs are being consequently recast as undertakings to do the 
minimum necessary and eligibility for state support is reengineered so as to apply only to 
those for whom barriers to achieving wellbeing ‘can and can only’ be overcome by the 
intervention of a local authority (Clements, 2015; for example see Welsh Government, 2015, 
part 4). An intensification in the rationing of adult social care suggests that the work of caring 
is being increasingly pushed into the private, unpaid and unregulated realm of the family. 
However, there are also considerable impacts on the paid care workforce (Fernandez et al., 
2014; Lethbridge, 2011). Austerity in the UK has intensified a preexisting and well-
established neoliberal obsession with the transfer of public provision into private-sector 
markets and it has amplified the gendered impact of this shift (Allen and Taylor, 2012; 
Fawcett Society, 2012; Walby, 2015). Hence, whether care is paid or unpaid, it is frequently 
women who fill the gaps left by the retrenchment of the state (Duffy et al., 2013; Fawcett 
Society, 2013). 
Both in its formal manifestations and in families, care is the foundation of the state's human 
infrastructure (Boydston, 1990; Glenn, 1992, 2010; Kessler-Harris, 1982). In respect of elder 
care, the austerity approach would seem especially complex. For several decades the 
populations of member states across the EU have seen falling birth rates and rising life 
expectancy. The meeting of elder care needs is a pressing issue with which EU member states 
must engage (Duffy et al., 2013; England and Folbre, 1999; Lethbridge, 2011; Taylor-Gooby 
et al., 2015) and depends in part on their ability to organize social care as a major site of paid 
employment (Carers UK, 2012; Lethbridge, 2011; Novitz and Syrpis, 2015). 
However, the very existence of an ageing population is recurrently constructed as an 
intractable social problem (Hansard, 2013; Langan, 1990; Pierson, 2002; Stone and Weiner, 
2001). Care for the elderly is conceptualized as a bottomless pit of need and expenditure that 
threatens to precipitate ongoing economic crisis (Carers UK, 2012; Mullan, 2000; 
Rasmussen, 2004). Indeed, in the UK political attention to the care of older people is overtly 
driven by a desire to contain or reduce demands on the public purse (Dilnot Commission, 
2011). Elder care is presented as if synonymous with accounts of ‘financial crisis’ (see the 
‘Good Care Costs Less’ speech by Health Minister Jeremy Hunt, October 2014; Commission 
on Public Service Governance and Delivery, 2014, paras 1.31-41). These conflated sites of 
‘crisis’ — the ageing population, and the financial crash of 2007–08 — appear alongside 
each other in a dynamic and shifting narrative about the need for public spending cuts (see, 
for example, Corsetti, 2012; Wallace et al., 2013). The spectre of a care ‘crisis’ at the heart of 
an ongoing financial ‘crisis’ is thus one aspect of a wider political project: tackling a 
perceived societal problem of state-supported human dependency (Taylor-Gooby and Stoker, 
2011). The notion of domestic caregiving as a source of formal, paid employment is 
systemically undermined by the discursive coincidence of care with economic crisis as well 
as by the state's desire to (re)orientate political recognition of human dependencies from 
being public to private concerns. Implications for increased gender inequality arise from ‘the 
association of care with the feminine, and therefore the subordinate, [which] is both a 
statement about the values of a society and the demographic profile of those who perform 
paid and unpaid care’ (Duffy et al., 2013, p. 148). 
Care work as time work and the rise of electronic monitoring 
The preceding discussion has introduced ‘austerity’ as a multifaceted term: it straddles many 
fields in economic, political, legal and cultural forms (Centre for Local Economic Strategies, 
CLES, 2014; Evans, 2012; Latimer, 2013; Oxfam Case Study, 2013; Potter and Westall, 
2013; Taylor-Gooby, 2009; Wynn, 2013). However, austerity is also a ‘time orientation’ that 
produces or promotes particular understandings of time (Nuttin, 1985). Heather Latimer 
argues that austerity is ‘future orientated’ in the sense that it focuses its justification for the 
harsh treatment of particular social groups on preserving the ‘good life’ for future 
generations. Accordingly, austerity exhibits a generational temporality that anticipates the 
future, as it takes effect in the present (Brammall, 2013; Latimer, 2013). This orientation 
supports a discourse in which ‘good’ citizenship is expressed as an individual sustainability 
of the self that is future-focused, in place of a prior emphasis on citizenship and individual 
rights that might be secured in the present moment (see Lonergan, 2015). 
Discourses of austerity represent the ideological (re)generation of new and old gender 
regimes as values of worth and worthlessness are assigned to particular social communities 
(Latimer, 2013). Perceptions of generational division are used to justify an accelerated 
rollback of the welfare state and this is perhaps exemplified in the UK government's decision 
to rule out meeting the future additional costs of care for older people through general 
taxation on grounds that it would unfairly place ‘a heavy burden on people of working age’ 
(HM Government, 2009, p. 18). Contrast this with the emblematic ‘cradle to grave’ 
foundations of the British welfare state, which expressed the commonality of ageing as a 
shared journey in common time (see Schües, 2011). This appeal to the homogeneity of 
human experience stands in sharp contrast to austerity's appeal to self-reliance among ageing 
‘individuals’ who are living longer and are required to manage the consequences of their own 
over-consumption of (life)time. 
Concerns about the inadequacy of public spending on adult social care predate the UK's 
austerity programme (Fernandez et al., 2014). However, adult social care is the largest 
category of local-authority expenditure and a principle casualty of austerity (Centre for Local 
Economic Strategies, CLES, 2014; Fernandez et al., 2014; National Audit Office, 2014). 
Between 2010 and 2014, local authorities absorbed an effective 26 per cent cut in funding 
and have consequently redoubled their efforts to purchase care from private-sector 
contractors at ever-lower prices (Association of Directors of Adult Social Services, ADASS, 
2015; Public Accounts Committee, 2014). The imposition of tighter eligibility thresholds 
means that about a third of elderly people who would previously have been eligible are now 
unentitled to state-funded care (Age UK, 2015; Fernandez et al., 2014). It has been estimated 
that a million elderly individuals are left to struggle alone with tasks that are fundamental to 
their day-to-day existence (Triggle, 2015). The shift of the homecare workforce over two 
decades from the public to the private sector has effectively removed this large cohort of low-
waged women from access to legal protection against discriminatory pay setting, as well as 
from the benefits of provisions set out in collective agreements covering public-sector 
workers that included occupational pensions and (what are now considered) generous sick 
pay and holiday entitlements (Hayes, 2014; Lewis and West, 2014; Thornley, 2006). Across 
the UK, an overwhelming majority of homecare jobs are with private-sector employers and 
most homecare workers are employed by care companies, although direct-hire arrangements 
between workers and service users are facilitated where local authorities provide ‘direct 
payments’ to enable service users (or their family/representatives) to arrange care themselves 
(Fenton, 2013; Hasler and Marshall, 2013; Hayes, 2017). 
Several studies have connected employment insecurity and low wages in homecare with the 
use of zero-hours employment contracts (Bessa et al., 2013; Kingsmill, 2014; Koehler, 2014; 
Rubery and Urwin, 2011). This form of contracting is now standard within the industry 
(Gardiner, 2014) and it means that there is no legal obligation between employers and 
workers to provide or perform work (Adams and Deakin, 2014). Zero-hour contracting 
reflects employer preference for work-on-demand scheduling (Jacobs and Padavic, 2015). 
Under these arrangements, staff bear the risk of a loss of work or pay when a service user is 
admitted to hospital or a care home. Zero-hour contracts make it easier for employers to insist 
on irregular working hours, resulting in episodic and unpredictable working time, while staff 
tend not to be paid for time spent travelling between clients (Rubery et al., 2011). Indeed, 
zero-hour contracts are a key mechanism through which ‘unproductive’ time is managed out 
of the labour process, with paid and unpaid working time blurred since homecare workers are 
required to be constantly available to their employers and have to wait around in periods 
between visits. Accordingly, home care is discursively constructed as an industry in which 
there is ‘not enough time to care’; it would seem that austerity is producing new narratives 
about temporal deficit in home care (see Bolton and Wibberley, 2014; UNISON, 2012). 
The marketization of care is a reductive process that strives to conceive of care as a 
commodity for capitalist exchange. Yet, as previous UK studies of homecare work have 
evidenced, formal organizational strategies seeking efficiency and profit in the context of 
care-contracting fail to capture the relational complexities of homecare work (Bolton and 
Wibberley, 2014; Rubery et al., 2015). Homecare work is an embodied practice that requires 
mental and physical patience (England, 2005). It is not set in a free-floating ‘timelessness’, 
but demands an appreciation of the changing and adaptive human body. It is in the relational 
connection between caregiver and care receiver that home care is ‘co-produced’ (Needham 
and Carr, 2009) and hence homecare workers must exhibit an interactive capacity to wait for 
direction or response. These values of patience, change and waiting (Stoller, 2011) point to 
the temporal dimensions of home care. The labour of homecare workers is experienced by 
service users as ‘time’ in the sense of their appreciation of homecare worker presence (see 
Edebalk et al., 1995; Eustis and Fischer, 1991; Francis and Netten, 2004). Homecare workers 
invest in relationships with service users that require that they have time to ‘be with’ another 
person; to be curious about them and develop solidarity with them (Cameron and Moss, 
2007). ‘Time’ is the inseparable backdrop against which ‘care’ takes place. This is not to say 
that the only experience of homecare service users is the experience of presence, nor that 
home care is the gift of time, but rather that ‘time’ and ‘care’ are inseparable conceptual 
domains. 
Electronic monitoring technology has increased the capacity for local authorities and care 
companies to extract unpaid labour from homecare workers by targeting the organization of 
their working time. Homecare workers are required to use landline telephones or GPS mobile 
telephone systems to register the minutes they spend inside each service user's home and it is 
on the basis of these minutes that the homecare worker is paid. Since the local authority is 
paying only for contact time (rather than paying a set price for the preprogrammed length of 
the visit it has commissioned), the cost savings are sizable. For example, by requiring 
homecare providers to operate electronic monitoring systems, Hampshire County Council 
saved in excess of £1million in 2013–14 (CM2000, 2014). Devon County Council and South 
Gloucestershire similarly reported savings equivalent to 10 per cent of their entire purchasing 
budgets for adult social care by paying only for ‘actual’ care delivered. The collecting of real-
time data about homecare workers’ whereabouts and visit durations enables invoices to be 
generated automatically between their employer organization and the commissioning local 
authority. Fees are paid on the basis of this contact time only and the employer remains 
responsible for the full costs of service delivery (which includes the cost of homecare 
workers’ time associated with training, supervision, team meetings, sickness, holidays and 
missed calls due to service users’ arrangements or hospitalization). The labour cost of non-
contact time, however, is effectively erased because it is constructed as unpaid working time 
in the context of downward pressure on local-authority care budgets. From a managerial 
perspective, electronic monitoring is discursively constructed as a means to ‘enhance [care 
worker] performance’ in order to deliver services at the rates required by local authorities (for 
example see person specification/job description, Renaissance Personnel, 2016). However, 
the logic is to save money by reducing the proportion of homecare workers’ time that is paid 
time, and to intensify labour (IPC Market Analysis Centre, 2012). The narratives of the 
homecare workers we interviewed substantiate this argument. 
Methodology 
Care workers’ views are largely absent from research about social care (Eaton, 2000; Hayes, 
2017). However, we are aware of two prior empirical studies that have produced insights 
about the use of electronic monitoring. Brown and Korczynski's study (2010) of an electronic 
monitoring pilot scheme in public-sector homecare services found that it intensified labour 
but did not reduce the discretionary effort of workers. In contrast to our study, results were 
ascertained through the use of workplace surveys by a directly employed local-authority 
workforce for whom pay and hours of work were assured irrespective of electronic 
monitoring. 
The Department of Health commissioned Rubery et al. (2011) to embark upon a 
comprehensive mixed-methods study of recruitment and retention in the social-care 
workforce (including day care, residential care and homecare provision across the public and 
private sector, 2007–10). Although the research did not focus on electronic monitoring, its 
final report noted that if electronic monitoring was to become widespread in home care it 
might reduce pay by ‘restricting paid work time, to time actually spent in people's houses’ 
(Rubery et al., 2011, p. 4). A more recently published examination of working time based on 
data from the same study characterized HR practices as relying on the ‘goodwill’ of 
homecare workers to work more hours than those for which they are paid (Rubery et al., 
2015; see also Bolton and Wibberley, 2014). 
Our research was funded through a British Academy/Leverhulme small grant. We sought to 
explore the impact of electronic monitoring on wages, hours and the employment experiences 
of women working in home care in one city in the south-west of England. We considered that 
participation in this research might expose our participants to unfavourable treatment at work 
and hence chose not to recruit through employer contacts. The focus was on the private 
sector, where union membership is very low; hence we did not engage homecare workers 
through trade-union routes. Rather, we used social media to promote our research and 
additionally recruited participants through local networks. Following initial expressions of 
interest from potential participants we conducted a telephone discussion with each of them to 
ascertain their eligibility for inclusion in the study. 
In the summer of 2014, we conducted in-depth interviews with 14 homecare workers about 
their recent experience of electronic monitoring. Nine of our participants were currently 
working for private-sector care companies (each had a different employer); six of these 
participants worked on the basis of a zero–hours contract, three did not (they had a contract 
that provided a minimum guarantee of paid hours of work). A further five participants had 
recently left their employment with care companies and were now working under direct-hire 
arrangements as personal assistants to older and disabled people. Despite a tendency to 
change their jobs between one care provider and another, all participants were committed to 
continue working in the care sector and felt a strong sense of professional commitment to the 
older and disabled people with whom they worked. Interviews lasted up to 3 hours and all but 
two took place in participants’ own homes. Therefore, the levels of information disclosure 
may have been higher than if the interviews had taken place in a more formal setting. Each 
homecare worker gave written consent for the data to be published. All data has been 
anonymized and pseudonyms used. 
We triangulated our data through analysis of documentary evidence from two neighbouring 
local authorities responsible for commissioning homecare services and separate interviews 
with six local-authority officers: a senior manager for a leading provider of electronic 
monitoring software/systems; a senior manager at a disabled persons’ independent living 
centre that offers support to care users in receipt of direct payments; and three employers. 
There are a total of 28 interviews with 25 participants. The data presented in the findings are 
drawn from the interviews with homecare workers. 
Findings 
Our interview data evidenced that homecare workers understood electronic monitoring as a 
system that limited their pay and, on the most favourable assessment, would allow their pay 
to correspond to the length of time they spent in a service user's home. Charlotte explained 
how electronic monitoring worked on a day-to-day basis. When she arrived at a service user's 
home, she would say ‘hello’ and then ask to use the landline telephone to ring a freephone 
service. She would use her own personal code to activate the automated answer-facility 
service (hosted by the electronic monitoring service provider). It would enquire of her, ‘is this 
the start of the call or the end of the call?’ and she would use the keypad to answer the 
question. According to Charlotte the purpose of the system was:  
They can clock if you're five minutes late, a minute late or whatever. The same going out, 
they know exactly what time you leave. But you could leave dead on time but they don't give 
you any time for travelling. You can be stuck in traffic for twenty minutes, half an hour, but 
you don't get paid for that. And then they're questioning you why are you late? It's not a case 
of skiving off anywhere, you are stuck! 
Charlotte talks about the electronic monitoring system as ‘they’ — a disembodied power that 
controls her, transcending her individual employer. ‘They’ check if her timekeeping matches 
minute by minute with her schedule; ‘they’ are aware of her leaving a call; ‘they’ are 
responsible for failing to pay for the time it takes her to get to the next appointment and 
‘they’ regard her with suspicion and hold her to account. This (dis)identification points to the 
dimensions of the ‘technology relation’ in which many of the homecare workers situated 
themselves. When Charlotte was not ‘clocked in’, her work was not recognized as paid 
labour. The technology relation essentially determined when she was either visible or 
invisible for the purposes of controlling her movements and her pay. 
Although electronic monitoring restricted earnings by anchoring paid time within service 
users’ homes, differences arose between the intended contact time and the actual time for 
which homecare workers were paid. The unpredictability inherent in working both ‘on the 
road’ and ‘in the home’ meant that neither the visit times, nor the duration of visits, would 
necessarily match with official intentions. Hence, the idea that it was only ‘travelling time’ 
that was unpaid was not the full story. Unpaid labour also included large periods of time 
when calls overran, as well as time involved in meeting statutory requirements (such as 
attending induction or manual handling training) and maintaining good working relations (for 
example time in supervision or at team briefings). 
The UK Homecare Association (the employers’ representative body) has estimated that about 
19 per cent of homecare workers’ time is spent travelling (and hence is generally unpaid) 
(UK Homecare Association, UKHCA, 2015). However, our research participants typically 
regarded their ‘working time’ as the length of time for which they wore their uniform and on 
this measure, it was only about half of their working time that would qualify for pay under 
the electronic monitoring regime on a typical day. Shelley had been employed in a series of 
different homecare jobs under a variety of contractual arrangements and she explained, ‘I 
can't think of any other job where you would actually be ready to work, keep your uniform on 
all day and only be paid for a few hours. It's just absolutely nutty, not enough for a wage to 
live from’. Her experience was of committing herself to work a 15-hour day, wearing her 
uniform for this length of time, yet receiving anywhere between 5 and 8 hours of pay in 
return. 
Amongst our research participants, dissatisfaction with pay was not only felt deeply and 
widely; it was also directly attributed to electronic monitoring. The proportion of a working 
day that attracted pay appeared arbitrary to many homecare workers because electronic 
monitoring was necessarily inflexible, yet service users’ care needs and personal 
requirements could change on an hour-by-hour or day-to-day basis. Many homecare workers 
were frustrated at a growing realization that they had little choice but to behave in ways that 
put the correct operation of the telephone system at the centre of their attention, ahead of 
what they believed should have been a primary concern for the quality of care services. The 
operation of the technology actually reduced homecare workers’ autonomy and left them ill-
equipped to deal with the demands of the job. As Kate, a homecare worker with many years’ 
experience, explained, ‘some people can spend half an hour on the loo, or they could have an 
accident where they mess themselves and you've got to stay there and clean them. You can't 
walk away’. Set within the technology relation, such integral and responsive aspects of 
caregiving were rendered problematic and placed workers under huge pressure in situations 
already charged with emotion. Inevitably, unforeseen circumstances required homecare 
workers to stay and deal with the situations in which they found themselves. However, under 
the electronic monitoring scheme there was no corresponding commitment that workers 
would be paid. Because of low pay, Tessa was considering leaving her current job and she 
described how management placed responsibility for her irregular earnings directly with the 
commissioning local authority:  
They said to us, if we went over our time with a service user we wouldn't get paid because 
that's not the contracted hours. The council won't pay them, the agency, so the agency won't 
pay us. So if we did an extra hour, which happened quite often if somebody had a fall or 
someone wasn't well and you stay on because it's your duty of care, we wouldn't get paid for 
that. 
Anne had been working for a homecare agency up until eight months ago, and now worked 
as a personal assistant. She recalled a time when a stairlift had broken down and she was 
faced with ameliorating the distress of both her service user suspended in the chair and the 
service user's husband, also a disabled person, who was stranded upstairs. She spent several 
hours trying to manage the situation until engineers arrived and yet ‘didn't get paid for the 
hours of being there [but] you can't just walk out of the door and leave and say “well, my 
time is up now, I've got to go!”’. 
Although a majority of the homecare workers in our study were engaged on the basis of zero-
hours arrangements, several had employment contracts that guaranteed a minimum number of 
paid hours, to be worked flexibly. However, these guaranteed-hours contracts did not provide 
for fixed hours of work. For example, Alison had a contractual guarantee of 37 hours of paid 
work each fortnight. She explained: ‘obviously you don't get [paid] from the time of starting 
work to the time of finishing’. The pay guarantee essentially bound Alison to work for as 
long as it would take her to register at least 37 hours of homecare provision via the electronic 
monitoring system. In return, she would receive at least 37 hours of pay each fortnight. 
However, she had no control over the allocation of her work and she worked at the demand of 
her employer, on a flexible basis. Gaps in between visits, extra time when visits overran and 
her travelling time all remained unpaid. Even a well-organized work schedule could involve 
an hour and a half of unpaid ‘hold ups’ each day and Alison explained: ‘over a week, that's 
nearly a whole day's pay that you are working for nothing’. Her guarantee of 37 hours was 
not a guarantee that fixed her working time. Rather, it provided her with the promise of a 
minimum income based on a minimum number of paid hours to be accumulated within an 
unknown number of working hours. 
Cycles of over- and under-staffing were commonly experienced by our research participants. 
Even though Tessa had a contract that guaranteed her a minimum of 16 hours of pay each 
week, she was adversely affected when her employer took on new workers and competition 
for hours of paid work increased. She found that many of her regular calls would be assigned 
to new workers and she had to work for longer periods of time to fill up her ‘guarantee’ of 
16 hours’ paid work. She was sent further afield, her travelling time increased and she had to 
work on her notional days off. Tessa said it felt like ‘you were working for nothing, really not 
working for anything’. 
Rita was a homecare worker who described electronic monitoring in derisory terms as, ‘this 
system where we are on peanuts’. She perceived that electronic monitoring put her under 
intense pressure to meet externally driven time constraints that were simply unachievable. As 
a result, she lost pay. Employed on a zero-hours contract she was subject to electronic 
monitoring, and paid on a minute-by-minute basis. Visits that had been scheduled for 
30 minutes could actually net her only 15 minutes of pay if she arrived late; and her late 
arrival was frequent. Rita's heart went out to ‘the poor clients’ who suffered when a call was 
too short, but the overriding imperative of working to the diktat of the electronic monitoring 
scheme meant she knew she had to leave on time to get to the next person. 
On days when Rita's rota was crammed with more calls than could be properly serviced, the 
greater intensity of her work perversely resulted in her earning less. Each separate visit 
introduced new sources of potential unpaid time and she claimed her co-worker calculated 
that the introduction of electronic monitoring had resulted in a wage drop of £50 a week. Rita 
identified the different ways ‘you're losing out’ with each call, even when the job was going 
smoothly: waiting for colleagues to turn up to assist with a two-person task such as hoisting a 
heavy service user; not being able to clock in until family members had finished their own 
personal telephone calls; explaining to service users ‘about ten times’ why the telephone call 
was necessary and reassuring them it would not add to their telephone bill. Sometimes, the 
technology would fail. At other times, and particularly when she was in a hurry, Rita would 
simply forget to clock in, so she lost money that way. Both homecare workers and employers 
in our study identified that forgetting to log in or out was quite a common occurrence and 
could result in neither the worker nor the homecare provider being paid for the visit. 
For Shelly, shifts were never guaranteed but her dissatisfaction with income irregularity went 
beyond the issue of zero-hours contracting. She reasoned, ‘I really enjoy the work but it's just 
the clocking in system is awful’. If she arrived late for a call that was officially scheduled to 
last for 30 minutes, the fixed end point of pay for the visit would not be extended, meaning, 
‘you can only clock it in as quarter of an hour, but invariably it takes you longer than that’. 
Homecare workers considered that visits scheduled for 15 minutes were particularly 
exploitative because the increased volume of visits meant there was a greater concentration of 
visits that would overrun, and hence a greater proportion of their working time went unpaid 
(such short visits are used by 74 per cent of local authorities; see UNISON, 2016). Shelley 
tried not to leave care tasks unfinished and this meant she was always behind the clock and 
really struggled to make ends meet. She claimed that electronic monitoring limited the people 
who could ‘survive’ in a homecare job to those ‘people who've got some other support 
financially because it's not viable to do it’. 
Indeed, low pay meant that homecare workers who did not have partners in well-paid work 
were dependent on state benefits, particularly for housing costs. Karen's manager had 
explicitly told her that she was expected to rely on her husband to manage the 
unpredictability of her earnings. Tessa was under pressure from her partner to stop working 
because she didn't get paid for enough of her working time and consequently her employment 
was of marginal economic benefit to the family. Morag had been forced to borrow money 
from her children and other family members when her pay packet was so small that she didn't 
have enough for food and heating. 
Gillian resented being expected to treat service users like machines who would perform to 
cue when working for a homecare agency and had recently started working directly for an 
older person instead. She felt that under conditions of electronic monitoring she had been 
expected to think about service users like there was no need for ‘human care’ and ‘be like, 
right come on Mrs so-and-so, we've got to get you in and get you washed, dressed … put 
drugs in you, whip the hoover around quickly and then out again’. Her concerns were echoed 
by Donna, who said that the set times covered by electronic monitoring bore little relation to 
the actual performance of her work and ‘we have to cut corners sometimes’ like neglecting 
the washing up or failing to empty the bins. Her strong sense of commitment to her service 
users, however, meant she would often return to the same home later in the day to finish her 
duties, outside of the watch of the electronic monitoring system and consequently without 
pay. Other interviewees were either unwilling or unable to engage in such discretionary 
labour and expressed embarrassment at being pushed into situations of ‘professional 
incompetence’ when they were working in a hurry. 
Homecare workers claimed that the intensification of labour imposed under electronic 
monitoring produced a greater proportion of unpaid time in their working lives and also 
increased the risk of error because ‘people started rushing it … mistakes happen’. The work 
of correcting these mistakes was another source of unpaid labour. Homecare worker Rita 
recalled an occasion when a service user had been given the wrong medication because an 
overstretched homecare worker ‘forgot to concentrate’. Getting appropriate medical support, 
reassuring the service user and informing their family not only involved Rita in many hours 
of unpaid time, but it also meant that all her other calls for the day were allocated to someone 
else and she ‘lost the work, through no fault of [my] own’. 
Discussion 
Our study highlights that the relationship between paid and unpaid working time determines 
earnings in home care and that the construction of ‘care’ as ‘time consumption’ connects 
homecare workers’ wages to issues of care quality. Electronic monitoring rescripts what 
matters most; and what counts inside the homes of older people is conformity with 
predetermined and disembodied calculations of clock time. Hence, electronic monitoring is 
not merely a tool used to implement time-management practices and deliver budget cuts for 
local authorities; its collective significance is to reconfigure understandings of working time 
and of care. 
Electronic monitoring purports to monitor care quality (in the sense of ensuring that visits are 
made), at the same time as it strips care of its interactive flexibility and attempts to deny the 
relational underpinnings of individual service. The exercise of caring skills and the quality of 
care provided are hidden from view. Electronic monitoring is a disembodied and all-
pervasive form of control that reduces the practice of care to the fulfilment of a series of tasks 
within a predetermined time period, which is often illusory. Bolton and Wibberley (2014) 
have suggested that home care is organized as a combination of formal and informal (often 
discretionary) labour. Our findings suggest that electronic monitoring explicitly demarcates 
formal from informal labour, removes social interaction and has the potential to undermine 
the discretionary labour that is noted in other studies as being a central feature of homecare 
work and the gendered relations that underpin it (Bolton and Wibberley, 2014; Rubery et al., 
2015). 
All the participants in our study thought that they were underpaid; not on the basis of their 
hourly wage, but because they considered that the quantity of unpaid work now required of 
them was unjust and exposed them to considerable wage uncertainty. The reconfiguration of 
paid and unpaid working time under electronic monitoring appears to have made it clearer to 
homecare workers that a significant proportion of their labour is unpaid. In the 
‘unknowability’ of the circumstances and events that will define each visit, homecare 
workers experience anxiety because the quantity of working time required for care-giving 
may not match the time formally made available as paid time. It suggests that electronic 
monitoring forces women into relations of economic dependence, because of low pay and 
unpredictable pay. Ironically, wage uncertainty coexists with the very clear demarcation 
between paid and unpaid time that electronic monitoring purportedly embeds. 
Our findings have implications for the legal regulation of pay in the homecare sector, 
particularly in light of the current Conservative government's national minimum wage policy, 
which has introduced a higher rate ‘national living wage’ for workers aged 25 and over from 
April 2016. Although this policy has the potential to improve pay in low-wage industries, it 
does not address the problems that lie behind an established pattern of widespread non-
compliance with national minimum wage law in the homecare sector (Bessa et al., 2013; Low 
Pay Commission, 2016; National Audit Office, 2016); fails to address gendered weaknesses 
in the statutory framework that facilitate unpaid working time (Hayes, 2015, 2017); and does 
not impose national minimum wage liabilities on local authorities for the wages of workers 
who deliver public services and are employed by contactor organizations. It would seem that 
while contractors and commissioning local authorities purport to cede control over pay-
setting to a technology, homecare workers are highly aware that commissioning local 
authorities require and orchestrate unpaid working time. Rubery and others have argued that 
social care policy-making overlooks the significance of employment relationships in home 
care and disregards expectations of contractual commitments and the enforcement of labour 
standards (Rubery and Urwin 2011; Rubery et al., 2012). Our findings additionally suggest 
that electronic monitoring exacerbates homecare workers’ sense of subordination in the 
labour market through facilitating the explicit control of their paid working time by local 
authorities who are not their employers and do not carry legal responsibility for wages. 
Zero-hours contracting and electronic monitoring are discrete strategies deployed in the 
homecare market. While zero-hours contracting dispenses with contractual commitments to 
provide regular work, it can blur the relationship between paid and unpaid labour by 
expecting workers to be available for work as and when they are required. Yet zero-hours 
contracts, on their own, do not necessarily require work without pay. An effect of electronic 
monitoring, however, is to empty the employment contract of its basic legal premise that 
wages will be provided in rational exchange for work undertaken. Electronic monitoring 
demarcates, in abstract, what is paid and what is unpaid. However, as the participants in our 
study explained, electronic monitoring shaped the haphazard way in which pay attached to 
working hours in practice. 
Conclusions 
A legacy of structural conditions and gendered norms, through which the caring labour of 
women has been disregarded and undervalued, continues to shape paid care work. By 
exploring electronic monitoring from the perspective of homecare workers, we can see that 
its introduction signals the degradation of work, intensification of labour and removal of 
autonomy over work. Although technology facilitates social change, it always ‘enters the 
present culture, accepting and exacerbating the existing norms and values’ in and through 
time (Bush, 2009, p. 119). In considering questions of social equality raised by the 
implementation of this technology we have argued that electronic monitoring gives 
expression to gendered hierarchy by constructing care as a temporal commodity in order to 
exercise economic control over women in domestic spaces. It enables the state, in the form of 
local authorities, to engage in third-party surveillance within the employment relation and to 
benefit from the consequent quantitative reduction of paid working time. Rubery and Rafferty 
(2013) predicted that austerity would have a disproportionate impact upon women, and that 
women would resist removal from the labour market. Our findings bear this out, but also 
point to very real reductions in pay and conditions for women working in this rapidly 
expanding sector. 
Time is socially produced by practices that persuade that a specific timeframe should govern 
in a specific context (Eriksen, 2001; Gurvitch, 1963). Austerity has foregrounded specific 
representations of time that have been taken up and intertwined with the production of social 
care. The plausibility, and hence implementation, of electronic monitoring in home care 
hinges upon establishing that it is legitimate and justified to measure care in a time of 
austerity; and then to use that measuring to ration service provision and limit the extent to 
which homecare workers are paid for the care they provide. In our study, electronic 
monitoring was shown to reconstruct homecare provision by imposing a routine of clocking 
in and out that served to emphasize that time was rationed and externally adjudicated. It did 
not introduce regularity into care arrangements, did not advance rational nor realistic work 
scheduling, and seemed incapable of ensuring sustainable relationships between care workers 
and service users. 
Electronic monitoring also exerts gendered and qualitative forms of control by producing care 
work as an unpaid activity. It represents a power to determine when workers may be rendered 
practically and economically invisible in the performance of their duties. This technological 
capacity to ‘appear’ or ‘disappear’ homecare workers is integral to the construction of care in 
a time of austerity. As a ‘technological fix’ for the underresourcing of social care, electronic 
monitoring communicates political suspicions that public monies may be wasted in paying 
for care and hence stringent controls and rationing can be ostensibly justified. This speaks to 
the austerity project of erasing recognition of human dependency as anything other than a 
private concern; to gendered expectations of women's propensity to give care without pay; 
and it reinforces the perceived inefficiency of ‘problematic’ aged or disabled bodies. Such an 
influence strengthens the ability of corporations to accumulate economic benefit from the 
commodification of care in a time of austerity and does so by (re)turning to powerful 
associations that connect paid employment and legal entitlements with the protection of male 
interests. 
In a time of austerity, both services users and homecare workers are expected to 
accommodate the consequences of underfunding. Griffin (2015) has claimed that austerity 
discourses appropriate women's purported tendencies to behave responsibly and iron out day-
to-day problems as a form of crisis management to which women are ‘naturally’ suited. Our 
study suggests that, situated within the technology relation of electronic monitoring, 
homecare workers bear emotional, physical and economic responsibility for the failure of 
care systems to deliver adequate care services. They are required to fill gaps in care provision 
that arise in the wake of retrenchment by the state. Electronic monitoring itself is a ‘time 
perspective’ (Nuttin, 1985, p. 16) in the sense that it structures and specifies the behavioural 
acts we label ‘care’ and quantifies them as ‘time consumption’. Thus contests over the 
appropriate adoption of legally or managerially instituted notions such as ‘travel time’, ‘clock 
time’ or ‘working time’ are also struggles to assert the legitimacy of subjective notions such 
as ‘time to care’. 
We agree with Harrington (2012) that ‘struggles over time … are also commonly struggles 
over basic ethical and political values (p. 5). Electronic monitoring appears to be ostensibly 
justified on the basis that a ‘crisis’ of underfunding in adult social care can be controlled by 
enforcing stringent controls on the labour cost of the homecare workforce. Its focus on 
effectively punishing homecare workers for late arrivals by reducing their pay shifts blame 
for the practical effects of under-resourcing onto their shoulders as individuals. Electronic 
monitoring also undermines the ability of homecare workers to concentrate on the provision 
of care in the psychological present. They are constrained in anticipation of future need (in 
the shape of concerns about the timing and requirements of their next visit, as well as by an 
intensification in service rationing, short visit times and their experience of low and irregular 
wages). Under systems of electronic monitoring, a lack of regard for homecare workers as the 
bearers of employment rights, and an emphasis on their moral and social responsibilities as 
‘good citizens, is brought sharply into focus by the highly gendered requirement that an 
increasing proportion of their working time is provided without pay. In a time of austerity, 
their individual expectations of a right to be paid on the basis of their actual labour are 
disappeared from view. 
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